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Andrew Brody
The present slowdown in growth rates of production
and also of productivity, experienced since the 1970s
and reported world-wide, probably has several,
presumably interdependent, causes. Let us inspect
some of the possible explanations.
Energy Crisis
A favourite scapegoat in economic and political
apologia is the energy crisis, the vaulting price of oil,
gas and coal which caught the world economy by
surprise in the mid- l970s. Yet - except for the sudden
and decidedly portentous price hike - there were no
other signs indicating an actual crisis; the known
symptoms of emerging shortage (for example,
gasoline queues at petrol stations in the United States
during the six-day war in 1973, just prior to the OPEC
price rise) turned out to be short-lived. And it later
also transpired that they have been mostly artificial:
partly fabricated insidiously to make subsequent price
increases more palatable to the individual consumer.
By and large supplies could be stretched to meet
demand. Improvised and mostly poorly conceived
rationing proved to be transitory and there were no
drastic cuts in general availabilities. Yet the profits
and dividends of oil companies ascended nicely and
the demand-supply balance fairly soon adapted itself
to the new price relations.
Of course price changes do have their consequences:
some countries (mostly the non-oil-producing develop-
ing countries) and some products have been hit hard.
Yet the extent of the actual price increase remained a
thoroughly insufficient explanation for the subsequent
general inflation and price adjustments. However
steep the rise in energy prices, the direct energy content
of most products in most countries seldom exceeded a
fraction of its total costs.
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Nor was this change apparently unexpected for some.
Idle wells were increasingly being exploited by the
1960s in all parts of the world; the conspicuous success
of the OPEC organisation in driving up prices could
have been anticipated in the face of a steady rise in coal
prices.
In a historical sense this flare-up of energy prices was
also not a novelty: earlier in the 1920s, the oil prices
had peaked, echoing two earlier price explosions of the
1 820s and 1 870s. (US heat and light price series clearly
reflect these eruptions.) In all these cases the general
trend of the economy also reversed, and above average
growth rates declined to a marginally slower pace.
We may suspect here a cyclical undercurrent in the
general economic motion: the waves of accelerated
development breaking on the barrier created by the
slowly advancing energy production, the latter
characterised by very high capital requirements and
long gestation periods. In all probability other
branches of the extractive industries, sharing the same
economic characteristics, have also had an attenuating
effect on over-accelerated growth: these are the
branches of the economy which tend to be the least
flexible in the long run, which behave sluggishly and
may thus be held responsible for the slowdown.
Long Waves
Are the extractive industries really the culprits? We
turn our attention here to the Kondratiev theory of
50-60 year long waves or cycles. This theory and the
very existence of these long waves have become a
much debated issue recently. The history of the
Kondratiev theory itself exhibits an obvious Kond-
ratiev cycle: after lying half forgotten in the
background for 50 years after its inception, an
increasing number of papers now address the topic.
But, alas, this seems to be the one and only Kondratiev
cycle which lends itself to statistical verification! Both
the cycle and our present statistical apparatus are too
weak to support a conclusive proof and much longer
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economic time series are needed to support or reject
the theory. Yet at the same time, and for the same
reasons, we are unable to disprove its existence.
If we accept - 'believe' - in its existence we may
envisage the problem in the following way: let us
assume that the long-run rate of growth is equal to an
annual growth of roughly 2.5 per cent as claimed for
the last 100 years or so in the advanced countries.2
Suppose that 98 per cent of national product is
growing without resource or any other constraints at
the trend rate of 2.5 per cent, whilst the remaining
2 per cent of national product is subject to a long-wave
or Kondratiev-component with a 50-year cycle. lt will
be found that at the peak of boom the growth rate
reaches 4.5 per cent while at the bottom it shrinks to
0.5 per cent. Just a slightly more powerful Kondrauev
component ofa 2.5 per cent relative weight in national
product totally extinguishes any growth and induces
all the syndromes of stagnation. If ever available, the
statistical evidence for the existence of Kondratiev
cycles will therefore inevitably be weak. The cyclic
component itself is probably very weak, and,
moreoever, it does not have to be strong to cause
considerable difficulties. In the price series, where
Kondratiev originally noticed the cycles, it is now
overshadowed by the somewhat erratic rate of
constant inflation since the advent of paper money. In
the quantitative series, problems of measurement and
qualitative and technological change blur the picture.
Population Cycles
There is nevertheless a territory on the border of
economics - demography - where measurement is
more accurate and does have a longer tradition. And
here, indeed, long waves were rediscovered and
renamed as Easterlin cycles. A lucid explanation also
suggested itself as a theoretical account for the
historical fluctuation. The renowned demographer
Keyfitz has unravelled the story for the United States.
He argued that the high fertility of the 1950s and its
subsequent decline in the 1960s was due not to changes
in general prosperity, but to changes in the incomes of
couples of childbearing age. Thus, couples of
childbearing age in the 1950s were born in the 1930s,
between the birth-rate humps of the 1920s and the
1940s. As a result these couples benefited not only
economically, but also in terms of security and a sense
of wellbeing. These effects were so strong that the
predictions of the classic demographic model with
fixed age-specific rates were entirely reversed. Rather
than the 1 950s birth rates echoing the dip of the 1930s,
the rise in birth rates of about 20 per cent over trend in
the 1950s over-compensated for the fact that the
number of parents was about 10 per cent below trend.
Table I b) of the iniroduction implies an annual average rate of
growih for 1870-1979 of 2.6 per cent per annum [eds,].
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Keyfitz argues that the birth-rate decline in the l960s
was due to the large cohort of parents born in the
l940s, and predicts that it will not be until the 1990s
that the parental generation will he small enough to be
encouraged to have large families. Keyfitz's model
therefore suggests population waves of two generations
in length.
Two generations equals 50 years. or somewhat more
- depending on the median childbearing age - and
matches perfectly the suspected length of the
Kondratiev cycle. And the fluctuation is really strong
enough to be readily observable in demographic data.
How do these two cycles, the demographic and the
production cycle, interreact?
Production and Population Cycles Combined
If birth rates fluctuate then the age structure of the
population must also undergo changes. There will be
times when relatively many people are in the active
workforce, while the number of children and
pensioners is relatively low. Again, there will be times
when a great number of under- and over-age
dependents must be catered for by a relatively small
workforce. There are therefore periods when the costs
of schooling and of the pension system are small, so
that much more can be spent on economic
investments, triggering a higher-than-average growth
rate. This ebullient economic climate, as experienced
after the end of World War II, gives the faulty
impression that it is possible to provide for much more
and far better schools, much higher pensions, more
lavish general health care, etc. And statesmen and
politicians did yield to this temptation and enacted the
required legislation to further such a great society and
welfare state where universal happiness waits round
the next corner.
These hopes, based on the illusion of averages and
smooth development, clashed with the real world in
which the number of students and pensioners
increased, the relative strength of the active workforce
decreased, and before long the welfare system found
itself everywhere in shambles. Funds became
insufficient, budgets went into the red - and
statesmen and politicians had to face the uneasy task
of reneging on their promises, going back on codified
statutes without proper explanation and with the
usual sorts of circumlocution. It is unnecessary to
elaborate the political climate this entails, whether in
the East or the West, in the North or South.
If the term mal du siècle (malaise of the century) was
coined for the Great Depression prevailing at the end
of the 19th century - a depression having a very
similar economic background - then we now face the
coming troubles of a mal du millénaire (malaise of the
millenium), and the occasional slivers of hope and
optimism will be scant and few. Still, if we are able to
rise above the horizon of our own time and own
generation we may harbour some more hopeful
perspectives. The economic machine operates clumsily
and slowly but it does operate: if the age structure of
the population or the rate of growth become distorted
by internal forces, the same forces will correct, then
overcorrect them. It is only a question of time, though
unfortunately of a length which is unavailable to us as
individuals.
Technological Cycles
There is a still more disturbing symptom to explain
here: why did the increase in productivity also slacken?
In earlier times the periods of recession have been
noted for technological innovation, and the usual
bursts of technological improvement were so
pervasive that Schumpeter founded a fairly convincing
cyclical theory precisely on this contrary motion:
slowdown giving impetus to innovation and new
innovations propelling the system into new accele-
ration. Professor Kaldor, once an ardent follower and
elaborator of the Schumpeterian theory, felt dis-
satisfied with the Schumpeterian model, arguing
rather that production and productivity go hand in
hand. It is difficult to pinpoint the clusters of
revolutionary new technology. Atomic energy,
according to the view ofJ. von Neumann and others in
the 1950s, should have made the cost of electricity
negligible in the 1980s, but in practice it has made it
very expensive. Microelectronics, however impressive,
has failed so far to work the same wonders as
electricity itself did at the turn of century. Other
features of the 1920s invention-innovation cycle, such
as nylon, penicillin, polythene, radio, radar, television,
xerography, catalytic cracking, continuous steel,
internal combustion and diesel engines, helicopters
and jets, rockets, do not appear to have present-day
equivalents. Much new product innovation centres
around military technology, but missiles and satellites
are not especially productive.
The sources of inventive and innovative thinking, if
not drying up entirely, certainly are not flowing as
freely as they used to, and their trickle may well come
to a standstill. Why did we always take technological
development for granted? Those two to three per cent
yearly increases in productivity were a historical
product of the last two centuries, directly benefiting
only a small part of humanity: the more remote parts
of humanity spent their lives in a very slowly
developing, if not stagnating technological environ-
ment.3 What encouraged us to extrapolate a yearly
two per cent improvement in productivity into
This point is also made rather dramaticaliy in World Development
Report, World Bank, 19114 5-6 [eds].
eternity? Zero growth is endurable, but zero growth
coupled with zero development, without technological
change, without qualitative improvement is a
nighmare. Yet indications that we are heading in this
direction multiply.
In spite of the mounting sums spent everywhere on
Research and Development something seems to be
amiss in the field of creative work and teaching. On
closer inspection a number of unmistakable trends
emerge. First, the material conditions for scientific
and teaching work - and ofthe creative types of white
collar workers generally - have probably worsened in
the past century. Freedom in selecting the subject of
research and in the publication of results are two
pillars of sound development - and these basic
freedoms are being trimmed by commerce and
bureaucracy, though to a varying degree, in all parts of
the world. The harm done to fundamental science
causes incomparable damage in the technological and.
ultimately, in the economic sphere. The dwindling
esteem in which government, business and society
hold the profession of scientists and teachers is clearly
expressed in their relative earning-potential which
shows a continuous drop in the last two centuries if
compared with the earnings of, say, the ordinary
waged worker. And the same can be observed for the
earning differentials of unskilled workers and skilled
technicians. I believe this is a natural outcome of the
present bargaining situation, where first these
occupations and professions are unionised to a
minimal degree, and second, even if unionised, their
bargaining power is significantly less, or negligible. In
most branches of the economy the production time is
relatively short, giving considerable potential bar-
gaining to workers through the strike weapon. But any
refusal to work by scientists or teachers has little force:
it has no noticeable economic consequences because
of the very long production times involved. There is a
noticeable exception which strengthens our case.
Physicians and lawyers, who may help or endanger
one's life or freedom, by and large kept their salaries in
line with historical relativities. Consequently these
professions remain the chosen carrier for the best
talents. Perhaps we should not bemoan this fact, but
just acknowledge the foregone opportunities for
productivity improvements.
These trends cannot go on for ever. There are already
countries - Czechoslovakia and Hungary for
instance - where the accumulated lifetime earnings of
a secondary school teacher do not reach the level of the
average semi-skilled worker. But mankind, after a lot
of extra trouble, loss and malfunction will come to the
conviction that these relations have to be altered.
Sooner or later it must transpire that those countries
are doing relatively better where the teacher, the
scientist, the skilled worker is better off, in respect to
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living standards, social standing and personal
freedom. The situation in the Federal Republic of
Germany or Japan is decidely better than in other
parts of the world, and it already shows. Thus one can
envisage economic forces which may remedy the
allocation, but only with very long time lags.
Conjunctural Slowdown
All of the processes identified - energy production,
population cycles, technological innovation - and
many others, reproduce themselves through time in a
cyclical fashion. If the downswing of the longer-run
cyclical phenomenon, particularly those arising from
population growth and technological change, come
together at the same time, combining with shorter and
medium-run inventory and investment cycles, then the
outcome is slowdown. Empirical verification of the
role of population and technological cycles in the
current slowdown are notoriously difficult to
establish, but as noted above, their effects do not need
to be particularly powerful to produce long-run
cyclical effects. While this may add up to a bleak
future, it would not deserve the name of crisis, since it
does not exhibit a necessarily downward spiralling
trend. However, present-day circumstances lack even
this reassuring feature!
The State and Military Expenditure
One of the most perturbing symptoms of contemporary
national accounts can be found in the high share of
transfers within the domestic product, indicating and
measuring the involvement of governments in
economic matters. Some causes of the latter were
given previously. If the economic machine operates
sluggishly, if it procrastinates, hesitates or falls to
deliver the goods, there will be a rational excuse for the
authorities to intervene. The tragedy is that there
appear to be no limits to government intervention.
The distribution of the national income between
wages and profits is a process which economic forces
will keep within relatively narrow limits both in
market and in planned economies. Yet there seems to
be no such intrinsic or economic process or limit to the
amount of transfer payments or other government
activities. Government budgets bear no relation to
other economic indicators, as is clear from the analysis
of military expenditure.
Professor Pigou in his Political Economy of War came
to the considered opinion that whereas in peaceful
times this seldom surpasses two per cent, in a national
calamity spending may jump to half the national
income. How long such a situation may be maintained
is one of the still-unanswered questions in economics.
It is even more difficult to estimate accurately how
much is actually spent today. Professor Leontief,
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compiling data in the 1970s for his World Model,
found various percentages, ranging from around four
to five, to 20 per cent. It was conspicuous that the oil
producing developing countries had the highest
shares, not because they are the most bellicose, but
because their expenditure consists mostly of imported
items, which are very difficult to hide.
Alas, there is no statistical consensus in this respect
and a clear distinction can seldom be made, because
most defence spending can be so readily tucked away,
for example, as expenditure on Research and
Development. The enormous rise of Research and
Development expenditure perhaps indicates not
respect for science and innovation but the attraction of
the dangerous glitter of weaponry. Defence spending
can also be concealed as investment in seemingly
peaceful fertiliser and chemical plants, electricity
generators driven by atomic power, engineering and
steel producing capacities, communication systems
and so on. One of the most serious repercussions of
such an investment strategy is the universal increase in
pollution, because these branches happen to be those
which produce the most dangerous pollutants and will
- with military and political help - tend to override
environmental considerations everywhere. Con-
sidering all this we cannot err much if we judge
contemporary defence spending as being of the same
order of magnitude as ordinary investment into
productive capacities. Simple arithmetic would
indicate that this by itself cuts the growth rate
available for the world to half its possible size. Yet the
actual situation is worse, since by throwing economies
off balance by 10 to 20 per cent, it may eventually
cause not only stagnation but actual deterioration, as
the theory outlined above indicates.
Crisis
Si vis pacem, para bellum, (if you wish for peace,
prepare for war) goes the old Latin adage, and if the
costs per capita of killing become so very low, while at
the same time defensive measures became forbiddingly
expensive or impossible, there seems to be no way out
of escalated armament, even if the overkill accumu-
lated is already sufficient to wipe out organic life on
more than one planet. The potential dangers for the
future are terrifying. The only hope of reversing this
self-aggravating process is research into truly
defensive technology. This seems to be avoided by the
superpowers - one almost suspects under a tacit
agreement. Other countries will sooner or later
investigate the technological possibilities of protection
and preservation, redefining the very concept of
defence in the process. If such a process restores
economic balance between the costs of attack and
defence, then mankind may once again cherish hopes
for survival. Until then, the crisis prevails. Its
economic consequences have been made more or less
clear. The ideological consequences must be mounting
alienation from government as such, a revival of all
colours of anarchist - even anti-social - theories.
If Professor Kenneth Boulding, a sober citizen, good
scholar and patriot, in a paper given to ITASA
(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis)
on similar problems, comes to the conclusion that he is
unable to decide whether his government actually
defends or lethally endangers him, we, as subjects or
citizens of any part of the world, cannot but concur.
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